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Japanese Economic Aggression, Organized Labor’s
Resistance, and the Path to World War II
Tho m a s M i l e s ∗
This paper examines economic aggression from the Japanese fishing fleet beginning in 1936 and the response from
organized labor in America prior to the famous attack on Pearl Harbor. The focus of this is research is primarily from the
perspective of American labor, drawing heavily on the Voice of the Federation newspaper, which was a publication owned
by the Maritime Federation of the Pacific. The US government was aware of encroachment of Japanese floating canneries
in 1936, but took little action against Japan in order to avoid worsening tensions between the two nations. However, in
1937 Harry Stuhr, the head of the Alaskan Fisherman’s Union, observed and photographed the Japanese vessel named the
Taiyo Maru and encouraged organized labor to petition Congress, institute a boycott on Japanese goods, and instigated
anti-Japanese sentiment across the US. The result would be the exacerbation of racial stereotypes against the Japanese,
increased public fears of war, and eventually the establishment of international conservation zones.

Int ro d u c t i o n
In explaining the origins of the war between the United States and Japan, historians emphasize
Japanese territorial aggression in Asia, pointing to such well-known examples such as Japan’s
attacks on Manchuria in 1931, China in 1937, and the East Indies and Indochina in 1941.1
Japanese expansionism was certainly the most important factor in the rise of tensions between the
United States and Japan, but historians have given much less attention to the economic dimension
of the struggle between these two nations. During the latter half of the 1930s, the United
States and Japan were already in conflict, however, this conflict was not over Japanese territorial
expansion, but over issues concerning natural resources. In 1936, Japan sent an exploratory
mission across the Bering Sea and into Bristol Bay, Alaska. The following year the appearance of
a large commercial fishing vessel, the Taiyo Maru, signaled the full expansion of the Japanese
salmon fishing industry into Bristol Bay, touching off a three-year struggle over fishing rights
between Japan and the United States.2 This expansion was part of Japan’s search throughout the
Pacific and Asia for food and other natural resources. Americans responded fiercely to what they
considered Japanese incursion into their waters. Fearful that the Japanese large-scale fishing
would decimate the salmon, the Alaskan Fisherman’s Union, with the critical support of the
Maritime Federation of the Pacific and other elements of the labor movement, joined forces
to contest Japanese commercial fishing off the coast Alaska. In defense of American fishing
interests, the unions launched a nationwide boycott, a traditional labor tactic, against Japanese
goods. This boycott was also aimed at protesting the dumping of cheap Japanese products on
∗ Thomas Miles received a BA in History with a minor in Political Science in 2020. His research interests include
twentieth-century American labor history, twentieth-century American foreign policy, and decolonization in East Africa.
1See for example: Walter LeFeber, The Clash: US–Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: Viking,
1989); Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York: Norton, 1997); Waldo
Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988); Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untold Story of Economic Nationalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005),
96-99.
2Ross Coen, “Owning the Ocean,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 104, no. 3 (2013): 133.
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the American market and at the Japanese invasion of China. Maritime unionists and West Coast
politicians also called for legislation to protect the fishing grounds and pressured a reluctant
State Department to intervene. This public pressure helped intensify the existing anti-Japanese
sentiment across the nation and led to action by the State Department to force the Japanese out of
the waters near Alaska and contributed to heightened tensions between the two nations.3

Bac kg ro u n d
In the early twentieth century, Japan, which has a small land mass and few natural economic
resources, had a growing population and surging imperial ambitions. The depression of the
thirties and worldwide economic nationalism cut Japan off from its traditional markets and
“heightened the sense of vulnerability that came from its lack of raw materials and adequate
foodstuff.”4 In 1931 to help alleviate these problems, Japan used military force to gain control
of Manchuria, which was rich in agricultural production such as soybeans and wheat, as well
as minerals like copper and iron, all of which were in high demand in Japan and were imported
from other nations. The takeover of Manchuria and then its invasion of China in 1937 were the
opening moves of Japan’s larger strategy of gaining economic security through foreign conquest.
Americans were sympathetic to the plight of the Chinese, especially after viewing images of
Japanese violence against Chinese civilians. President Franklin Roosevelt called for a “quarantine”
against aggression, which heightened tension between the United States and Japan, which saw the
US as a barrier to its economic domination of Asia.5
The Japanese also looked to the sea to address its food shortages and to provide a product
for export. Fish was a critical part of the Japanese diet, and in 1935 fish products made up 20
percent of Japan’s exports. Fishing and canning provided employment to one and a half million
Japanese. Salmon was a particularly valuable commodity for export. In the thirties Japan was
even more aggressively expanding its fishing fleet and sought access to new fishing grounds,
including the rich salmon fisheries of the North Pacific. In the spring of 1936, the Japanese Diet
approved funding for a three-year survey of fishing resources in the Alaskan waters, seeking
particularly salmon and trout, and in the early summer sent several ships into Bristol Bay to begin
investigating the salmon run.
The movement of the Japanese boats into the waters off Alaska threatened the US fishing
industry as did Japan’s adoption of innovative fishing processing methods that were much more
efficient than American methods. The Japanese developed “floating canneries that made their
fishing fleets much more productive.”6 These were large Japanese fishing vessels that cast
extra-wide nets, with some being reported to being three miles wide in deep waters that enabled
3While there has been a study of the diplomatic negotiations between the US State Department and the Japanese
government over the Japanese incursion, the role of the labor movement in putting economic pressure on Japan through
its public relations activities and a boycott has been ignored. Jonathan G. Utley, “Japanese Exclusion From American
Fisheries, 1936-1939: The Department of State and the Public Interest,” Pacific Northwest Quarterly 65, no.1 (January
1974): 8-16.
4David M. Kennedy, The American People at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 76.
5F. R. Eldridge, “Manchuria-The Race for New Resources,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 168 (1933): 95-103; Kaoru Sugihara, “The Economic Motivations behind Japanese Aggression in the Late 1930s:
Perspectives of Freda Utley and Nawa Toichi,” Journal of Contemporary History 32 (1997): 259–280; Herbert Feis, The
Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of War Between the United States and Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1950).
6Kathleen Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific,” Far Eastern Survey 5, no. 23 (1936): 243-247.
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them to capture massive numbers of fish.7 One American fishing captain described the size of
these nets by comparing the lights on them to the outline of a small city at night.8 These vessels
could then process and can the salmon without having to return to shore and drop off their catch
at a cannery before returning to fishing unlike their American counterparts.9 This style of vessel
was originally used in 1930 as part of the Japanese crab fleet, but was adapted to salmon fishing
in 1936.10
Sightings of these ships in 1936 and 1937 alarmed American fishermen. The salmon fishing
industry was the largest and most productive industry in Alaska during the 1930s, with upper
estimates from tax receipts indicating that it accounted for 80 percent of total revenue in the
region.11 In 1937, the North Pacific Salmon Fisheries, which included British Columbia, employed
an estimated 64,000 people in Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, all of which hosted ports for the
North Pacific Salmon fleet, which employed 18.6 percent of all fisherman and 22.7 percent of all
secondary industries related to fishing, such as processing and transportation.12 By harming one
aspect of the economy, repercussions would be felt throughout the rest of the territory and also the
states of Washington and Oregon. This industry was so important that it was carefully regulated
by the federal government, with limitations on the length of the fishing season, the types of boats
that could be utilized and the fishing methods. The conservation goals of the Bureau of Fisheries
stated that half of all salmon were to escape netting in order to maintain the population.13
Since the industry was so significant in the region, it should come as no surprise that fishing
unions emerged in Alaska and in the Pacific Northwest to defend the rights of its workers. These
unions were far from homogeneous and included fierce competition between differing ideological
values, particularly whether or not these unions should represent the larger interests of West Coast
Fisheries or maintain a more local Alaskan focus. More locally oriented was the Alaskan Native
Brotherhood (ANB) that championed the interests of the Native Alaskan fishermen. Alaskan
Delegate Anthony Dimond was a strong advocate for the smaller local unions.14 The Alaskan
Fisherman’s Union (AFU), which was the first organization to call for a response to the Japanese
encroachment, belonged to the former group, with its headquarters actually based in Seattle. It
should be noted that the AFU also segregated its fishermen during the era and prioritized the
Caucasian fisherman through means such as directing minority (both Native Alaskan and Asian
American) vessels to less desirable regions. This provided precedent for later racial stereotyping
and attacks in the reports of Japanese fishing vessels. By 1936, all of Alaska’s fishing unions,
however, were under the larger union organization of the Maritime Federation of the Pacific
(MFP), which represented the entire West Coast fishing industry in collective bargaining. The
MFP was affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which was a large
conglomeration of industrial unions in the United States and had recently broken off from the
American Federation of Labor.15
7Marcus A. Rose, “Japanese Poaching in Alaskan Waters,” Reader’s Digest 31 (1937): 97-100.
8“Witnessed at Bristol Bay; Poachers Menace U.S. Unions,” Voice of the Federation, October 7, 1937, 8.
9Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific,” 245.
10Alaska Salmon Fishery. Hearings before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives,
Seventy-Fifth Congress, Third Session, on H.R. 8344, 1938, 12; Cordell Hull, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in
Japan, June 5, 1937, 745.
11Frank Richardson Pierce, “Are Fish Citizens?” Saturday Evening Post, November 6, 1937.
12Otis W. Freeman, “Salmon Industry of the Pacific Coast,” Economic Geography 11, no. 2 (1935): 109-129.
13Rose, “Japanese Poaching in Alaskan Waters.”
14David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2008), 146.
15Ibid., 150-155.
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In the 1930s, there was very little established international law that dealt with commercial
fishing and conservation. The only rule regulating international fishing was the “three-mile rule.”
While this rule is believed to be of Dutch origins, it was accepted into international law due to its
use by England and France in the nineteenth century when they were regarded as two of the most
prominent maritime powers.16 This was supposed to be roughly equivalent to the distance a canon
could fire during that time period, so it was not originally meant to be for commercial intent.17
This rule stated that each nation had territorial control, including commercial exploitation, up to
three miles away from its coast. This proved to be a contentious issue, as the Japanese were within
their legal right to fish in Bristol Bay. They did not encroach upon the three-mile limit, since the
Taiyo Maru was twenty-eight miles from the shore. The matter was complicated, however, as the
salmon were most definitely spawned in Alaskan streams, thus creating a case for the debate that
the salmon were in some way US property, a view adopted by many of the fishermen.18
Other natural resources throughout the Pacific had greatly suffered from Japanese exploitation.
One of these was the fur seal that had been hunted to near extinction by Japanese hunters
engaged in large hunting trips until the US, Russia, Canada, Great Britain, and Japan agreed to a
conservation act in 1911 to preserve the animals.19 It is important to note that it was Japanese
hunting techniques, which did not discriminate on the sex of the seal, that directly led to the
near extinction of the animal.20 Japan was also expanding into Antarctic whaling as well as tuna
fishing off of the coast of southeast China and the Philippines. Japan also had previously fished
salmon throughout Soviet waters following the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. This led
to the Japanese fishing industry to expand its operations into Kamtchka and the Okhotsk Sea.
However, due to immense domestic demand as well as growing demand from their primary export
market, Great Britain, the Japanese felt pressure to expand their canned fish production.21 This
was already previously seen with their cod fishing fleet. In Seattle, the American cod fishing fleet
was reduced down to two or three schooners after being unable to compete with the Japanese fleet
throughout the early 1930s.22 This helps explain the worries of the Alaskan Fisherman’s Union
as it had seen what could happen to an entire commercial fleet after over fishing occurs.
There were also strategic incentives for Japan to garner a secure hold on the Pacific salmon
industry if one assumes the nation was projecting the need to supply military forces spread out
through the Pacific. This would make sense as the Second Sino-Japanese War began July 7, 1937,
the very same week the Taiyo Maru was spotted near Alaska. Much as some historians interpret
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria to be a strategic move in order to secure iron for the Japanese
growing military, one can argue that Japan had similar motives for developing a new means of
efficiently catching and processing massive amounts of salmon without returning regularly to
port.23 This would have proved useful in providing food to feed a growing military in the Pacific.
The call to boycott Japanese goods by the Maritime Federation to protest Japan’s encroachment
on the schools of salmon spawned in Alaska was not the only reason to boycott Japanese goods.
16Edward Allen. “The North Pacific Fisheries,” Pacific Affairs 10, no. 2 (1937): 136-151.
17“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries; Unions Hard Hit by Pressure of Cheap Coolie Competition,” Voice of the
Federation, September 2, 1937, 1, 8.
18Kathleen Barnes and Homer E. Gregory, “Alaska Salmon in World Politics,” Far Eastern Survey 7, no. 5 (1938):
47-53.
19“Making the Fur Seal Abundant,” National Geographic Magazine 22, no. 12 (December 1911): 1139.
20Barnes, “The Clash of Fishing Interests in the Pacific,” 244-245.
21Nagaharu Yasuo, “The North Ocean Fishery in Japan’s Economic Life,” Far Eastern Survey 8, no. 9 (1939):
106-108.
22“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries,” 1, 8; Gordon Ireland, “The North Pacific Fisheries,” American Journal of
International Law 36, no. 3 (1942): 400-424.
23Eldridge, “Manchuria-The Race for New Resources,” 136-151.
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There already was a boycott against Japanese goods initiated in 1931 on a small scale by ChineseAmericans to protest the Japanese takeover of Manchuria. This escalated almost in sync with the
call to boycott Japanese goods by the fishing unions, as the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War
in 1937 inspired individuals from across the nation to boycott Japanese products as a means of
condemning Japanese imperialism. This boycott also was endorsed by the American Federation
of Labor as well as the Congress of Industrial Organizations, as part of a larger “buy American”
sentiment.24 As such, when discussing the effects of the Japanese boycott it is important to
keep in mind that these two boycotts, while separately organized and inspired, had the same
goal of discouraging American consumption of Japanese-made goods and services, and thus
it is impossible to completely isolate which boycott resulted in what percentage profit loss for
Japanese companies.
Ch ro no l o gy
The first official evidence of Japanese commercial fishing off of the coast of Alaska occurred on
June 8, 1936. The United States Coast Guard observed a vessel named the Chichibu Maru fishing
salmon with gill nets in the Bering Sea. The State Department pursued an inquiry with Foreign
Affairs in Tokyo, but the Japanese government simply replied that the fishing vessel was only
licensed to fish in Siberian waters and must have been off course.25
The appearance around the same time of the Japanese survey ships in Bristol Bay aroused yet
more concern in Alaska. There were fears that these non-commercial Japanese vessels threatened
Alaska’s security, both economically and militarily. There were charges that these Japanese
ships were spying on Alaska to assess it as a point of invasion, in particular the Aleutians. The
concerns about suspected Japanese espionage under the guise of surveying the fisheries off of
the Alaskan coast were brought to the US House Merchant Marine Committee by New York
Representative William Sirovich and Alaskan Territory Delegate and union ally, Anthony J.
Dimond. Representative Sirovich asserted that Japan was spying on the coast in order to “grab
Alaska and thus provide a food supply for the fish-eating Japanese people.”26
In February 1937 representatives of a worried Seattle Central Labor Council wrote to President
Roosevelt asking him to keep the Japanese away from the Alaskan fishing ground and helped
launch a letter writing campaign addressed to multiple government agencies including the
Commerce Department and the State Department, demanding government action to protect
Alaska. Delegate Dimond and other members of Congress from the Pacific Northwest also
pressured the State Department to defend the fishing and cannery industries. Washington Senator
Lewis B. Schwellenbach called on the State Department to negotiate an international agreement
excluding the Japanese from the Alaskan fisheries.27
As of June 5, 1937, the federal government had not yet responded to the concerns of
espionage that had been raised or concerns about the depletion of Alaskan salmon. The State
Department was opposed to any unilateral exclusion, fearing it would have a negative impact on
Japanese-American relations and that it would undermine Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s belief
in “free trade and reasonable access to the world’s resources” as a means of preventing war. As a
result, there was “no feeling of urgency” in the State Department about the Japanese incursion.
24Frank, Buy American, 96.
25Hull, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan, 745-746.
26“Japanese Spying in Alaska Charged,” New York Times, February 7, 1937, 12.
27Utley, “Japanese Exclusion from American Fisheries,” 9.
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Instead of confronting Japan, the State Department began working on a treaty for an international
salmon conservation organization. Aware that there were rumblings in the labor movement about
organizing a boycott of Japanese imports, the State Department sought to stifle the fishermen’s
protests rather than seeking a diplomatic solution favorable to the salmon industry.28
The following month on July 7, 1937, the Taiyo Maru, the huge Japanese cannery ship
accompanied by a number of smaller support vessels, was spotted twenty-eight miles from Alaska
again by the Coast Guard as well as by observers in a plane, including Harry Stuhr, who was
an AFU organizer and would became a major advocate for the union resistance to the economic
threat posed by the Japanese fishing fleet, writing regular articles about the struggle in the Voice of
the Federation, the MFP’s official newspaper.29 What made this event different from the Chichibu
Maru was both its greater proximity to Alaska and the fact that Agent Wingard of the United
States Bureau of Fisheries flew out of Alaska to the ship to verify Stuhr’s observation. Both
Stuhr and Wingard took several photographs from the air of the ships’ operations. These photos
included images of gill nets, the smaller Japanese fishing vessels that served the “mother ship,”
and most damning: massive amounts of salmon on the upper deck and a strange stack that ejected
water occasionally, suggesting that the salmon was being canned on board. They shared this
information with Delegate Dimond, which added fuel to Diamond’s campaign against Japanese
incursions into Alaskan fishing grounds.30 The Japanese government’s repeated claims that the
only Japanese fishing in the Bristol Bay area was for cod and crab now fell flat, as newspaper
articles about Japanese activity reached the American people.31
This incident provided the ammunition needed for union organizers to make their move. On
July 10, 1937, Stuhr’s charges were already published in the New York Times, along with those of
H. B. Friele of the Nakat Packing Corporation.32 Friele was the chairman of the board of the
Association of Pacific Fisheries and was with Stuhr when he observed the Taiyo Maru two days
prior. Together, they denounced the Japanese government and condemned it for its complacency
in unlicensed salmon fishing off the Alaskan Coast.33 Despite the immediate outcry of the AFU,
the government in Washington, both the Bureau of Fisheries and the US State Department, failed
to take any immediate action condemning the Japanese. Instead they favored a more cautious
approach, offering to send Leo D. Sturgeon, an officer of the Far Eastern Division, to investigate.34
This was a cautious decision made by the American government to attempt to avoid antagonizing
Japan, but would be viewed as betrayal by the American fishermen whose livelihoods depended
on the exclusion of the Japanese fishing fleet in Bristol Bay.
Friele assisted a joint investigation by the State Department and Bureau of Fisheries into the
extent of the Japanese impact in the region in 1937. At the time, however, the government had
little to no recourse, as there was no official policy being violated. As far as the investigation
could tell, the Japanese fishing vessels never violated the three-mile limit.35 In response, Delegate
Dimond proposed a bill that would push this limit to four leagues. (Four leagues is technically

28Ibid., 10, 13.
29“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries,” 1, 8; “Japanese Fish Poaching in U.S. Waters Stirs Effective Attack by Organized
Pacific Coast Seamen,” Voice of the Federation, September 9, 1937, 1, 6.
30“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries.”
31Eldridge, “Manchuria-The Race for New Resources,” 136-151.
32“Japanese Fishing Disturbs Alaska,” New York Times, August 29, 1937, 62.
33“Deny Japanese Claims,” New York Times, July 9, 1937, 4.
34“Japanese Fishing Alarms Alaskans,” New York Times, July 25, 1937, 29.
35“Japanese Fishing Disturbs Alaska,” 62; “America May Protest Japan’s Alaskan Acts,” Evening Star, November 8,
1937, A-5.
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13.81 miles rounded to the nearest hundredth.)36 Another source claimed twelve miles.37 Even if
this proposed limit change was accepted, however, it was unlikely to appease the AFU and other
unions, as this limit would not prevent the Japanese from intercepting massive salmon runs en
route to their spawning grounds in the Alaskan streams from Bristol Bay.38 This was coupled
with reports of sightings of other experimental Japanese fishing boats, these floating canneries,
throughout the Pacific including off the coasts of Panama and Australia.39
On September 2, 1937, the Voice of the Federation published an article written by Harry
Stuhr titled, “Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries; Unions Hard Hit by Pressure of Cheap Coolie
Competition,” that criticized the “treasonable alliance” of the Japanese government and American
fishing corporations. He denounced the inaction of Washington, charging that it was a result
of corporate influence on the government, since American companies would be glad to pay
lower costs for Japanese-caught Alaskan salmon. The reasons American fishermen had difficulty
competing with the Japanese fleet was due not only to its floating canneries, but the fact that the
Japanese fishing fleet was technically a part of the Japanese Navy and as such received significant
government subsidiaries. He also drew comparisons to the demise of the American cod fishing
fleet and the near extinction of the fur seal, illustrating the lack of conservation in Japanese
fishing techniques as the common denominator.40 One union fishing boat captain described the
government response as an “ostrich shoving its head in the sand.”41
Over the course of September and October 1937, the belief among union fishermen that the
United States government was ineffective at best and complicit at worst intensified. The Maritime
Federation published articles drawing attention to the “sneaking policy of Imperial ruthlessness”
that characterized the incursion of the Japanese. They advocated the establishment of a union
boycott of Japanese goods in the meantime and characterized their Japanese counterparts as
“poorly-paid robots of the Imperial Japanese government.” There were even claims that American
scrap iron that was exported to the Japanese would be used in weapons against American youth in
a “war to defend the country. . . from having its natural resources raided by a foreign country.”42
Other unions such as the Copper River and Prince William Sound Fishermen’s Union joined in
this call for the exclusion of Japanese products as a result of their encroachment into Alaskan
waters. They sent a resolution to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Commerce, Delegate Dimond, and all West Coast fishermen’s unions calling for such
action. They blamed Japanese “poachers” for the collapse of the Russian fishing industry and
warned that America would be next if no action was taken as well suggesting that these Japanese
vessels gave refuge to Japanese spies.43 There was also significant resentment noted as American
and Canadian fishermen adhered to specific seasons in the Bristol Bay region, while Japanese
vessels were thought to be fishing year round.44 Harry Stuhr summed up the fears of unions quite
succinctly, “Manchukuo yesterday, China today, and America tomorrow.”45
36“Jap Poaching on Pacific Salmon Banks Threatens Jobs of Alaska Fishermen,” Voice of the Federation, September
23, 1937, 1.
37“Japanese Fishing Disturbs Alaska,” 62.
38Coen, “Owning the Ocean,” 138.
39“Japan Goods Face Pacific Coast Boycott,” Pasadena Post, November 13, 1937, 1, 3.
40“Japanese Invade Alaska Fisheries,” 1, 8.
41“Jap Salmon Poachers Put U.S.A. on Spot,” Voice of the Federation, October 14, 1937, 1, 8.
42“Japanese Fish Poaching in U.S. Waters,” 1, 6.
43“Jap Fish Poachers in Alaska Waters Threaten $75,000,000 U.S. Industry,” Voice of the Federation, September 18,
1937, 8.
44Henry Wood, “Jap Fishermen Cause Worry by Their Zeal,” Hammond Times, September 28, 1937, 26.
45“Boycott of Japanese Goods Seen as Remedy for Invasion of Alaskan Fishing Grounds,” Voice of the Federation,
September 30, 1937, 8.
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Rising calls for labor action and boycotting were accompanied with imagery of violence
and warfare. At this point, as the Far Eastern Survey observed, the “resentment of West Coast
maritime labor against Japan and the desire for some form of economic action was no longer
solely predicated on the fishing issue, but had grown to include disapproval of Japanese action in
China.”46 Japan was increasingly described as militaristic and expansionist, with the incursion of
China being pointed to as evidence. Organized labor was both motivated by these fears and a
major contributor to them. The Voice of the Federation argued that if labor did not take action,
war would be inevitable and that a boycott would weaken the economic and, by extension, military
strength of Japan. The logic was that war was the ultimate goal of Japan and that the Japanese
goods being sold in America were a means of fueling its conquests. According to the Voice, “Such
is the cunning and desperation of the Japanese war-mongers to keep their bloody murder-mill
operating at all costs.” In equally evocative language, it contended that, “Everything ‘Made in
Japan’ is dipped in human blood before it reaches the store around the corner. Every dime spent
for Japanese products is turned into a bullet, every dollar into a bomb, in furthering the most
monstrous piece of international thievery in the annals of history.”47 Statements such as these
both criticized the militaristic actions previously taken by Japan in Manchuria and China, as well
as projected those imperial ambitions onto the Japanese incursions into Alaskan waters. In doing
that, organized labor gave reasons for the American people to distrust the Japanese and primed
them for what seemed like inevitable conflict.
On November 7, 1937, the Maritime Federation of the Pacific held a conference in conjunction
with the Alaska Fishermen’s Union in San Francisco to make plans for a labor-led national boycott
and picketing of Japanese ships. The conference called for less reliance on imported Japanese
canned goods, such as crab, opting instead for Alaskan and Russian-produced products.48 It
announced the initiation of a boycott of Japanese goods starting on November 15 unless the United
States government took “definite and strong action” against Japan.49 A key aspect of the unions’
argument for state-sanctioned protection of the West Coast salmon industry was the perception
that these salmon were property of the United States since they spawned within the Alaskan
border. Some fishermen even used the argument that, for people, being born in US territory made
them citizens of the United States. Therefore, by being born within the Alaskan territory, the
massive runs of salmon in the Bering Sea were the property of the American people.50
In addition to defending the fishing and canning industries, The Maritime Union and other
elements of organized labor sought to protect American workers from competition from low-wage
Japanese workers, who the unions dismissed as "coolie" labor. The "coolies" were the Japanese
employed on the smaller fishing ships and on the large “mother” cannery ships, who earned
much less than the union American fishermen and American employees of canneries in Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon. With lower wages, Japan was able to sell salmon for a lower price
than American-caught salmon. For American workers, their jobs, wages and livelihood were in
danger.51 At the same time unions were also angry at the Japanese for dumping low cost products
on the American market. These included textiles, novelties, and toys, as well as canned salmon.
Moreover, American unionists, like many other Americans, were appalled at the Japanese military
aggression and atrocities in China. Some unionists argued that Japanese military aggression
46Barnes and Gregory, “Alaskan Salmon in World Politics,” 52.
47“Jap Salmon Poachers Put U.S.A. on Spot,” 1, 8.
48“Forces Gather in S.F. for Establishing Boycott on Japanese Goods in U.S.,” Voice of the Federation, November 11,
1937, 1, 3, 6.
49“Coast Fishermen, Union Men Order Boycott Against Japs,” Henderson Times-News, November 18, 1937.
50Pierce, “Are Fish Citizens?”
51Voice of the Federation, September 14, 1937, 8.
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might soon be turned toward the United States. Therefore, Japan was not only an economic but
also a direct military threat.52
The announcement of the boycott’s start date and pressure from the Alaska Fishermen’s Union
resulted in a statement being released by the US State Department that it was preparing to ask
Japan to remove all vessels from Bristol Bay.53 Worried by the fear that inaction would result in
a Japanese-US crisis, the department finally “pressed the Japanese” with greater energy. The
American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, “saw ‘potential dynamite’ in the fishery trouble,
and, unless handled ‘very carefully’ there was likely to be some kind of blow-up which might have
just as serious a reaction on our relations with Japan as anything that has happened in China.”54
Encouraged by the signs coming from the State Department, the MFP delayed the start of
the boycott.55 Meanwhile, the Japanese government was still denying any commercial presence
in the region while simultaneously expanding into Australian waters near Melbourne in the
South Pacific.56 The delay was used by the MFP to provide infrastructure and solidify plans
and alliances, particularly in San Francisco. They requested the support of local merchants and
distributed cards that read “I don’t sell Japanese goods” to sympathetic businesses throughout the
city and urged them to hang them in store windows.57 Buttons and pins with this and similar
slogans were also distributed to promote awareness. They successfully enlisted the support of
other non-fishing unions such as the Contra Costa Central Labor Council, which was a reflection
of the growing anti-Japanese sentiment.
The Maritime Federation of the Pacific also joined forces with a nationwide humanitarian
campaign to boycott Japanese products that emerged on the heels of the Japanese July 1937
invasion of China. The campaign was backed by liberal and progressive organizations including
unions, veterans associations, churches, consumer groups, youth groups, and peace societies.58
In the late summer and fall of 1937, the liberal magazine the Nation issued the early calls for a
boycott, and in October 1937 labor federation rivals, the American Federation of Labor and the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, endorsed the boycott. The AFL’s call was the lead story
on the front page of the New York Times. It declared that militaristic Japanese “fanatics” were
waging an undeclared war and had killed and wounded thousands of innocent people and asserted
that “these atrocious activities will continue only so long as the Japanese are able to secure the
necessary finances through sale of the products of their exploited workers.”59
Local organizations formed to promote the boycott in the Pacific Northwest. In San Francisco
in November 1937 the United Committee for the Boycott of Japanese Goods (UCBJG) organized
task forces that regularly checked local stores to determine if they were carrying boycotted
Japanese goods, and other groups prepared to organize picket lines. The following month the
group conducted a picket line outside the San Francisco Emporium Department Store, protesting
its sale of Japanese silk and “Made in Japan” toys for children. The Maritime Federation joined
52Voice of the Federation, September 9, 1937, 1.
53“Forces Gather in S.F.” 1, 3, 6.
54Utley, “Japanese Exclusion from American Fisheries,” 14.
55Preston Grover, “Washington Daybrook,” Jefferson City Post-Tribune, December 1, 1937.
56“Japan Goods Face Pacific Coast Boycott.”
57“Boycott on Japanese Goods Gains Momentum as S.F. Committee Outlines Plans,” Voice of the Federation,
November 18, 1937, 1, 8.
58This campaign has received little attention with the exception of a short discussion in Dana Frank’s Buy American,
95-100.
59“Boycott Japanese Goods,” Nation, August 28, 1937, 211-212; Freda Utley, “Japan Fears a Boycott,” Nation,
October 2, 1937, 341-342; “Boycott of Japan Pressed by the AFL,” New York Times, October 8, 1937, 1; “Ceramic
Workers Start Boycott Against Japan,” Nation, December 14, 1937, 18; “‘Japanese Fanatics’ Hit in AFL Boycott Plea,”
New York Times, October 7, 1937, 4; “Boycott of Japan Backed,” New York Times, October 16, 1937, 1.
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the United Committee and its members marched alongside other community members on the
boycott picket lines.60
The political cartoons in the San Francisco labor paper Voice of the Federation were
exceptionally good at capturing the growing hostility aimed toward Japan. In a cartoon published
in October 1937, a Japanese soldier is depicted stomping on China while pointing his bayonet,
dripping with blood and cheap Japanese goods, directly toward the US An American worker is
standing on the shore, disgusted and waving away the Japanese. This cartoon depicts the threat
Japan posed toward US workers through cheap products and potentially toward US national
security. A similar November 1937 cartoon displays a Japanese and American worker preparing
to shake hands. The smiling Japanese worker is hiding a knife behind his back with the tag “coolie
wage competition” attached.61 The last political cartoon of the year depicts an Imperial Japanese
soldier dressed in a gas mask and Santa outfit, which is labeled “Japanese Imperialism.” His bag
of “toys” has “Made in Japan” written on it and inside are various toy weapons. The Japanese
soldier is handing a bomb-shaped toy to an American child and saying, “some day, little boy. I’ll
give you a REAL one!” Symbolism abounds in this cartoon, starting with the toys. Japanese toys
were one of the products on the boycott list. The Japanese soldier handing a toy bomb to the child
is in effect saying: If you buy these products, you will be funding real weapons of destruction,
and those will be used in America.62
These three cartoons depicted American feelings about Japanese militarism and the Japanese
economic threat to American workers. By showing Japan in such a negative light, they sought to
draw the attention and support of American workers. Tactics like these allowed the unions and
other groups backing the anti-Japanese boycotts to further their agendas more easily. Support
from the community was important in the effort to pressure the State Department to respond to
Japanese aggression.
December 1937 also marked an increase in national attention given to the plight of the
Alaskan fishermen. Articles by reporter Preston Grover gained significant prominence when
they were published on early December in newspapers across the nation. These articles briefly
summarized the events leading up to the proposed, but yet to be enacted, boycott of Japanese
goods beginning with the incident with the Taiyo Maru. The articles appeared in newspapers in
places such as Bluefield, West Virginia; Jefferson City, Missouri; and Las Vegas, Nevada.63 An
article published by the Buffalo Evening News and picked up by the Washington Evening Star
noted that the Alaskan salmon fishermen were “up in arms” over the poaching by Japanese fishing
boats in American waters. The fishermen warned the State Department that unless it ceased they
would picket Japanese ships and, in which case, “there may be bloodshed.”64
In February of 1938, the MFP upped the ante by publicly endorsing bill H.R. 8344, which
would have extended “American jurisdiction over the continental shelf,” and announced the
implementation of its boycott. It also threatened to order its members to refuse to handle Japanese
goods in shipping ports. At the same time, Alaskan fishermen threatened to cut Japanese nets if

60“S.F. Pickets Hit Japanese Goods Sale,” Voice of the Federation, December 9, 1937, 1, 5; Nathan M. Becker, “The
Anti-Japanese Boycott in the United States,” Far Eastern Survey 8, no. 5 (1939): 49-55.
61Voice of the Federation, October 14, 1937, 1; Voice of the Federation, November 4, 1937, 1.
62Voice of the Federation, December 23, 1937, 1.
63Preston Grover, “Washington Daybrook,” Bluefield Daily Telegraph, December 1, 1937; Grover, “Washington
Daybrook,” Jefferson City Post-Tribune; Preston Grover, “A Washington Bystander,” Las Vegas Daily Optic, December 3,
1937.
64“Fisheries Dispute,” Washington Evening Star, December 14, 1937, A-10.
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the Japanese attempted to fish in Alaskan water during the 1938 salmon fishing season. There
were also rumors that the fishermen were prepared to attack Japanese boats.65
In March 1938, the State Department decided to intervene by sending a diplomatic notice
calling for Japanese vessels to leave the waters of Bristol Bay. Japan agreed, however, the Japanese
continued to maintain their right to fish on the high seas. This “gentlemen’s agreement” was
initially perceived as a victory for organized labor’s campaign to combat the Japanese threat.66
The MFP proudly declared that Japan pulled out of Alaskan waters due to the fears of the boycott
and the “threat of the Alaska Fishermen’s Union to cut Japanese nets.” For justification for their
confidence in the power of labor and the liberals’ boycotts, the Maritime Federation could point to
Phillip Jaffe’s contention in 1938 in the journal Amerasia that “Japan fully realizes the significance
of boycotts” and to a 1939 study published in the Far Eastern Survey that suggested that as a
result of the boycott Japan suffered significant economic damage, especially to its textile export
industry.67
The intervention of the State Department and the peaceful settlement of the dispute between
Japan and the United States were influenced by several factors outside of labor as well. On
December 12, 1938, an American gunboat, the US Panay, was sunk near the Yangtze River in
China where it was protecting oil tankers belonging to Standard Oil.68 This event combined with
the continuous pressure from labor motivated both nations’ governments to reach an agreement
in order to reduce the tensions between the United States and Japan. Moreover, suspicions of
Japanese espionage continued to circulate. In Santa Ana, California, members of the American
Legion called for removal of Japanese ships due to their potential for espionage and the capability
of these ships to leave mines.69 This fear was exacerbated by public uproar over the sinking of
the Panay as well as rising calls for violence against the Japanese fishing vessels. Representative
Sirovich of New York urged Congress in February to quit “pussyfooting around” and bomb the
Japanese vessels off of the Alaskan coast.70 What resulted from these political considerations
and pressure from organized labor was the official public announcement from the Japanese
government that it would suspend licensing for any ships in Bristol Bay and remove their presence
from the region on March 26, 1938.71
However, this did not mark an end to labor’s struggle against intrusion of Japanese fishing
vessels in Bristol Bay. Japanese ships would continue to be spotted by Alaskan fishermen
occasionally until the outbreak of war. Two large factory ships similar to the Taiyo Maru
were spotted in Bristol Bay in May of 1939.72 There was even evidence of the Japanese fleet
expanding into regions besides Bristol Bay, such as in Katalla on the southernmost portion of
Alaska, where four ships were seen in August of 1940.73 Nor did the calls for violence against
these Japanese vessels end, as evidenced by a shipment of twenty-four rifles and ammunition
to Alaskan fishermen by the Secretary-Treasurer of the Pacific Coast Codfish Company for use
against any Japanese fishing vessels.74 As tensions continued to rise in 1940, the Coast Guard
began requesting planes to spot Japanese fishing vessels, only a year before the bombing of Pearl
65“War Lords of Japan Cut Country’s Export in Mad Scramble to Seize China,” Voice of the Federation, March 17,
1938, 8.
66“Alaska Wins,” Newsweek, April 4, 1938, 12.
67“Boycott Fear by Nipponese Ends Invasion,” Voice of the Federation, March 3, 1938, 1.
68Utley, “Japanese Exclusion from American Fisheries,” 13-15.
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70“Would Use Bombers to Halt Japanese Fishing Off Alaska,” Intelligencer Journal, February 2, 1938, 1.
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72“Jap Fish Boats Operating Again in Bristol Bay,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, May 9, 1939, 1.
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Harbor.75 There would also be continued interest expressed by congressional investigations as
of 1939 into Japanese fishing encroachment in both the salmon and herring industries.76 The
economic conflict continued up until the outbreak of WWII, as anti-Japanese sentiment within
organized labor and around the nation continued to grow.
After WWII, there was a distinct evolution of international fishing laws aimed at the protection
of commercial rights that was in part a result of the American labor union campaign to protect
American fisheries. On September 28, 1945, President Harry Truman released Proclamation
2668, which declared that the United States had the right to establish conservation zones and
regulate international fishing within those zones.77 There was public desire to further expand the
oceanic border beyond the end of the continental shelf while the American government had the
advantage of new military and economic power.78 The United States used its victory over Japan at
the end of World War II to finally create a lasting policy to prevent the over fishing of salmon by
the Japanese fleet.79 Furthermore, the Japanese fishing fleet, as a subset of its navy, was subject to
strict regulations imposed by the American government after the war. The two most important of
these dictated that the Japanese fishing industry adhere to US conservation guidelines and refrain
from deep sea fishing near any United States territories.80 As a result, the Japanese people faced
significant food insecurity until fears began to subside over the course of the next seven years, and
the US loosened its restrictions in an attempt to revive the Japanese fishing industry in 1952.81
Co nc lu s i o n
During the 1930s, the United States faced significant economic aggression from the Japanese
fishing fleet off of the coast of Alaska. It represented the economic side of 1930s Japanese
expansionism. At first, the United States did not wish to antagonize the Japanese government
and opted for a reserved strategy that equated success with inaction. Aware of the threat that
the Japanese fleet posed to the conservation of salmon in Alaska and the preservation of their
livelihoods, and aware of the Japanese involvement in the near extinction of the fur seal and
diminishment of the American cod industry, organized labor united under the MFP and took
significant action.
These actions included: securing concrete evidence of the Japanese presence, educating the
American public about the threat, pressuring Congress and the State Department, inciting antiJapanese rhetoric that relied on racist stereotypes and fears of imperialism, organizing and enacting
a boycott, and distributing anti-Japanese propaganda. The totality of these activities resulted in
increased fear of war with Japan, political action against the Japanese government, financial loss
in Japan’s export industry, and ultimately the establishment of international conservation zones.
As such, many working class Americans, especially those on the West Coast, were primed to go
to war with Japan, convinced that Japan’s imperial expansion would not cease until it was actively
stopped. The intense competition over natural resources between Japan and the United States,
75“Coast Guard Wants Planes to Spot Japs,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, February 15, 1940, 1.
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combined with the refusal of the Japanese Navy to remove its fleet or support conservation for
the long term benefit of both fishing industries and the refusal of organized labor to let America
become a victim of Japanese economic imperialism, contributed to the growing tensions between
these two nations that culminated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
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